t. 1: 1. ptie. Introduction. 2. ptie. Traduction.--t. 2. Commentaire. (2 v.).

Throughout much of this century the most prominent exegetes maintained that Aquinas’s mature moral psychology is fundamentally voluntarist, that he considers the will an independent cause of action, most conspicuously in his later works. Disagreement over the character of the will’s causal authority and the composition of the list of later works did little to unsettle their shared conviction that Aristotle’s intellectualist moral psychology was improved, indeed saved, by Aquinas’s insistence that the will can move itself, at least in some (...) fashion, apart from the influence of the intellect. See Rene Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, Aristote: L’éthique à Nicomaque, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970), p. 218; Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J.P. Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 93–97; Odom Lottin, “La Preuve de al Liberté Humaine chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale 23 (1956): 323–30; and Klaus Riesenhuber, Die Transzendenz Der Freiheit Zum Guten: Der Wille in der Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin (Munchen: Berchmanskolleg Verlag, 1971), p. 290. (shrink)

Pour la première fois en 1649, Descartes consacre une attention méticuleuse à la description de " toute la nature de l'homme ". Les passions ne lui fournissent pas une simple occasion parmi d'autres d'en traiter. Elles l'obligent surtout (et son lecteur avec lui) à se placer du point de vue du composé psychosomatique lui-même, soit à décrire, dans toutes ses manifestations et implications (éthiques notamment), cette " troisième notion primitive " que ni la philosophie première seule, ni la physique seule, (...) ne permettaient de cerner. (shrink)

René Descartes (1596-1650) is often presented as the founder of the "dualistic" thesis radically separating the soul from the body, in early modern philosophy. As such, he is likely to have initiated two kinds of revolutions: a revolution in the study of nature and living being(understood as inanimate), on the one hand; and a revolution in the study of the human mind(understood as the foundation of all knowledge), on the other. This entry focuses on his scientific work and overall reception, (...) as a way of understanding the interaction of these two fields. (shrink)

This is a translation of Des Vraies et des Fausses Idees by Antoine Arnauld, in which Arnauld demolishes Malebranche's version of idealism. It allows the reader with only minimal French (or Latin) the ability to recognize Arnauld's technical terms.

Spiritualism designates a philosophy that lays claim to the separation of mind and body and the ontological and epistemological primacy of the former. In France, it is associated with the names of Victor Cousin and René Descartes, or more precisely with what Cousin made of Descartes as the founding father of a brittle rational psychology, closed off from the positive sciences, and as a critic in respect to the empiricist legacy of the idéologues. Moreover, by considering merely the end result, (...) severed from its polemical genesis, we are prevented from understanding how the category of experience constituted a crucial question for spiritualism itself. Through returning to the origin of these discussions in the 1826 preface to Cousin’s Fragments philosophiques, this essay pursues a threefold path: to show that the public birth of Cousinian spiritualism coincides with the affirmation of applying the experimental method, issuing from Bacon, to the study of facts of consciousness; that Cousin’s later evolution follows a process of radicalization—that is, in this context, of ontologization and of reduction; and that by recovering this genesis, we can distinguish many forms of spiritualisms committed to the experimental method, both in alliance with the early Cousin and against the later Cousin. In this way, we can rediscover the interwoven philosophical links, lost in the process of institutionalization, between metaphysical demands and empiricist concerns, or between “French” philosophy and the legacy of Condillac. (shrink)

This edited volume features 20 essays written by leading scholars that provide a detailed examination of L’Homme by René Descartes. It explores the way in which this work developed themes not just on questions such as the circulation of the blood, but also on central questions of perception and our knowledge of the world. Coverage first offers a critical discussion on the different versions of L'Homme, including the Latin, French, and English translations and the 1664 editions. Next, the authors examine (...) the early reception of the work, from the connection of L'Homme to early-modern Dutch Cartesianism to Nicolas Steno's criticism of the work and how Descartes' clock analogy is used to defend two different conceptions of the articulation between anatomical observations and functional hypotheses. The book then goes on to explore L'Homme and early-modern anthropology as well as the how the work has been understood and incorporated into the works of scientists, physicians, and philosophers over the last 150 years. Overall, readers will discover how the trend over the last few decades to understand human cognition in neuro-physiological terms can be seen to be not something unprecedented, but rather a revival of a way of dealing with these fundamental questions that was pioneered by Descartes. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism comprises fifty specially written chapters on Rene Descartes and Cartesianism, the dominant paradigm for philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, written by an international group of leading scholars of early modern philosophy. The first part focuses on the various aspects of Descartes's biography and philosophy, with chapters on his epistemology, method, metaphysics, physics, mathematics, moral philosophy, political thought, medical thought, and aesthetics. The chapters of the second part are devoted to the (...) defense, development and modification of Descartes's ideas by later generations of Cartesian philosophers in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere. The third and final part considers the opposition to Cartesian philosophy by other philosophers, as well as by civil, ecclesiastic, and academic authorities. This handbook provides an extensive overview of Cartesianism - its doctrines, its legacies and its fortunes - in the period based on the latest research. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism comprises fifty specially written chapters on Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Cartesianism, the dominant paradigm for philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, written by an international group of leading scholars of early modern philosophy. The first part focuses on the various aspects of Descartes's biography (including his background, intellectual contexts, writings, and correspondence) and philosophy, with chapters on his epistemology, method, aetaphysics, physics, mathematics, moral philosophy, political thought, medical thought, and aesthetics. The (...) chapters of the second part are devoted to the defense, development and modification of Descartes's ideas by later generations of Cartesian philosophers0in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere. The third and final part considers the opposition to Cartesian philosophy by other philosophers, as well as by civil, ecclesiastic, and academic authorities. This handbook provides an extensive overview of Cartesianism - its doctrines, its legacies and its fortunes - in the period based on the latest research. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper studies Antoine Le Grand's account of organic identity over time in human bodies. In response to Aristotelian critics who argued that the Cartesian rejection of the Aristotelian ontology of matter and form had put in jeopardy the diachronic identity of material substances in general and of living bodies in particular, Le Grand argued that the identity over time of the human body could be accounted for without the traditional notions of matter and form. The paper shows how (...) he drew on both the Cartesian metaphysics of mind and body and contemporary views on human anatomy and organic generation to develop a unique account of bodily identity over time in human animals. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that some difficulties in René Descartes reflections on the idea of mind in his ‘Objections and Responses’ would unintentionally lead him to a ‘bundle theory’. In this sense, Descartes would not have been successful in showing that the mind would be something beyond the set of its modes or attributes. This hypothesis is based upon Descartes’ replies to Thomas Hobbes, Antoine Arnauld, Pièrre Gassendi and Marin Mersenne – third, fourth, fifth and sixth sets of (...) objections respectively. (shrink)

In the Aristotelian curriculum, De anima or the study of the soul fell under the rubric of physics. This area of study covered the vital (“vegetative”), sensitive, and rational powers of the soul. Descartes’ substance dualism restricted reason or intellect, and conscious sensation, to human minds. Having denied mind to nonhuman animals, Descartes was required to explain all animal behavior using material mechanisms possessing only the properties of size, shape, position, and motion. Within the framework of certainty provided by the (...) metaphysical foundations of his physics, he posited such mechanisms in accordance with appropriately lessened standards of certainty. As Cartesianism (or the Cartesian revolution) spread, adherents offered survey textbooks or treatises of physics to replace the corresponding Aristotelian curriculum. These books typically discussed the role of experience in physics and the appropriate standard of certainty. A comprehensive Cartesian natural philosophy needed to mechanize the offices of the Aristotelian sensitive soul, including sense perception, memory, and cognitive and appetitive responses to the environment. Descartes’ Treatise on Man (1664) offered an initial explanatory program. This chapter examines the role of experience in the natural philosophy and mechanistic psychology of Descartes’ English follower Antoine Le Grand. He offered detailed accounts of the sensory and motor mechanisms shared by human and nonhuman animals (for which he claimed “physical certainty”). These frame his Cartesian psychology. (shrink)

English summary: In this volume, Holger Gutschmidt has gathered together several studies on the concept of the idea and its relationship to the notion of justification in selected 17th century theories. His main focus is on the philosophy of Rene Descartes, who introduced the concept of the idea into modern epistemology. He devotes further chapters to Antoine Arnauld as well as to the logic of Port Royal, Spinoza, and finally Leibniz. The study of the concept of the idea (...) in the context of its function within theories of knowledge and justification has brought about a series of new research results as well as corrections to existing research. German description: Holger Gutschmidt versammelt in diesem Band mehrere Untersuchungen zur Konzeption der Idee und ihrer Beziehung zum Begrundungsbegriff in ausgewahlten Theorien des 17. Jahrhunderts. Sein Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf der Philosophie Rene Descartes', der den Ideenbegriff in die neuzeitliche Erkenntnistheorie einfuhrt. Weitere Kapitel widmet er Antoine Arnauld sowie der Logik von Port Royal, Spinoza und schliesslich Leibniz. Die Untersuchung der Ideenkonzeption vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Funktion in den jeweiligen Theorien der Erkenntnis und der Begrundung fuhrt zu einer Reihe von neuen Forschungsresultaten und Korrekturen der bisherigen Forschungssituation. Der Autor beschaftigt sich unter anderem mit dem Thema der von Descartes eingefuhrten sogenannten objektiven Ideen, dem Verhaltnis von Idee und Begriff, der Seinsart von Ideen, der Funktion der Idee von Gott, dem direkten Realismus. (shrink)

Elżbieta Walerich The Nature of an Idea according to A. Arnauld’s On True and False IdeasIn the work On True and False Ideas Arnauld attacks, above all, the part of Malebranche’s theory which concerns the ontological status of ideas. The French Jansenist claims that in this doctrine the perceiving mind is completely cut off from the real world created by God. The most important aim of the book is to prove, using geometrical method, the falsity of ideas if one understands (...) them as representative beings where the term representative being signifies a representative archetype different from the act of perception. Arnauld also criticizes the doctrine of seeing ideas in God. Nevertheless, he does not attack the representative standpoint in general but rather its radical version. He does not negate the division into an idea understood as mental perception and a physical thing being perceived. Like René Descartes, the French Jansenist thinks that all objects are known by means of perceptions which are modifications of our mind and, moreover, that we have the idea of God and the idea of the soul. Ideas are then our soul’s modifications and are the same thing as our perceptions. These are psychological beings having representative character, they make objects present to our intellect. So there are not two different entities but only one entity in two relations. When Arnauld claims that representative ideas are the same thing as the acts of perception, he means that modifications of our mind stay in relation to our mind which they modify and, at the same time, in relation to objects which they represent. The term perception underlines the ontological status: it is the modification of the mind. And the term idea indicates that it relates to external objects. The acts of perception represent external things but they do not imitate these objects like pictures do; their objective existence in the mind is different from the real existence of physical objects. When a thing is present to the mind in an objective manner, it does not mean that it is present as an object immanent to our mind but that it is known by our intellect, so that it is the object of the act of perception. The thing is present in our mind objectively when it is represented by the act of perception and then it becomes the intentional object of this act. Keywords: idea, perception, representation, representative being, modification of the mind, representationalism, objective existence. (shrink)

This article reports on a historical investigation carried out on the conical object MIN000-3519 preserved in the mineralogy collections of the Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle at Paris (France). The mineralogist René-Just Haüy (1743-1822) included this object, cut in a single pyrite (FeS2) crystal, in his working collection with the references ‘Sulphured iron, mirror of the Incas, of Peru, M. de Jussieu’. All of the research lines followed lead the author to Joseph de Jussieu (1704-1779) and his shipments of botanical specimens (...) and various other samples from South America. As a member of the Godin-La Condamine-Bouguer geodesic expedition on the equator (1735-1743), he returned to France only after 36 years (1771), ill, exhausted and dispossessed of the scientific product of his Andean collections. This pyrite mirror is important because, in addition to appearing to be the only archaeological object that can be linked to Joseph's peregrinations in America, it resembles other specimens found at sites of the Cañaris culture (500-1500 AD) in Ecuador. Preserved within the de Jussieu family, this object would presumably have been given to Haüy by Joseph's heirs, his nephews Antoine-Laurent (1748-1836) or Laurent-Pierre (1792-1866), with whom he had close ties. (shrink)

In the latter half of the 17th century, Antoine Arnauld was a public and private defender of many of the central tenets of Cartesianism. Yet, one issue on which he is surprisingly silent is René Descartes’ claim that God freely created the eternal truths (the Creation Doctrine). Despite Arnauld’s evasion of the issue, whether he holds the Creation Doctrine is one of the most contested issues in Arnauld scholarship. In this paper I offer an interpretation of Arnauld’s position. I (...) argue that Arnauld does not hold what I call the metaphysical version of the Creation Doctrine according to which God in fact freely created the eternal truths. Rather, he holds what I call the epistemic version of the Creation Doctrine according to which we cannot know whether God freely created the eternal truths. (shrink)

Summary At the beginning of the 1730s René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur published two long memoirs on a new type of thermometer equipped with a specially calibrated scale — known ever since as the Réaumur scale. It became one of the most common ‘standardized’ thermometers in Europe until the late nineteenth century. What made this thermometer so successful? What was it specifically? I will first argue that the real Réaumur thermometer as an instrument was a fiction, a ghost — (...) an idealized instrument. On paper, it was theoretically flawless. In reality, the standardized Réaumur thermometer was most likely never achieved. This article shows that its success was essentially due to a recontextualisation from theoretical natural philosophy — Réaumur's principle of uniformity — to: 1) the context of artisanal knowledge and practices and 2) the context of making and reporting in the Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences actual measurements done in the field (in Paris at the Observatory, in Provincial France, in the Colonies, and in the rest of Europe). Réaumur's thermometer was essentially a theoretical method to which was associated a particular scale. It was the instrument's reification for market consumption and fieldwork that gave this specific type of thermometer materiality and authority. Although most Réaumur thermometers ever made were strikingly different from one another, over time the thermomètre de Réaumur designation became a brand, a seal of approval born from customary artisanal practices and cultural habitudes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In 1730, shortly before his death, the Paris anatomist Joseph‐Guichard Duverney wrote his will, leaving his anatomical specimens to the Académie des Sciences, of which he was a member. But the will was disputed by Pierre Chirac, supervisor of the Jardin du Roi where Duverney, as professor of anatomy, had performed most of the dissections that produced the specimens. The ensuing debate between Chirac and René‐Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, arguing for the Académie, reveals the tensions surrounding both the (...) concept of intellectual property in this period and the collective enterprise in natural philosophy. The differing roles and audiences of the Académie and the Jardin were central to this debate. In addition, this essay explores the origins and significance of the anatomical specimens themselves and their changing role in instruction and display, as well as the transition from the cabinet of curiosities to the natural history museum. (shrink)

This chapter compares rationalist theories of sense perception to previously held theories of perception (especially of vision) and examines rationalist accounts of sensory qualities and sensory representation, of the role of the sense-based passions in guiding behavior, of the epistemological benefits and dangers of sense perception, and of mind–body relations. Each section begins with Descartes, the first major rationalist of the seventeenth century. The other major rationalists, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and also lesser known figures such as Pierre Regis, Jacques (...) Rohault, and Antoine Le Grand, were well acquainted with Descartes' work. Indeed, the first three were each deeply influenced by Descartes in their early years before developing their own philosophical systems, and the latter three were all advocates of Descartes' philosophy (perhaps with slight revision). Each of the major rationalists, while sharing some positions in common, developed a distinctive metaphysics of perception and of the mind–body relation. Earlier sections chart these differences and a final section sums up common features and touches on the continuing significance of their views. (shrink)

Suidas’ source for biographical data erroneously listed a treatise περὶ ναυστάθμου (On the ships at anchor) among the works of Nicanor. In the relevant notes on two passages from the Iliad, Nicanor is referring to Aristarchus’ monograph of the same title, not his own.

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 2 Seiten: 861-894.

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

The seventeenth century witnesses the demise of two core doctrines in the theory of perception: naive realism about color, sound, and other sensible qualities and the empirical theory, drawn from Alhacen and Roger Bacon, which underwrote it. This created a problem for seventeenth century philosophers: how is that we use qualities such as color, feel, and sound to locate objects in the world, even though these qualities are not real? -/- Ejecting such sensible qualities from the mind-independent world at once (...) makes for a cleaner ontology, since bodies can now be understood in purely geometrical terms, and spawns a variety of fascinating complications for the philosophy of perception. If sensible qualities are not part of the mind-independent world, just what are they, and what role, if any, do they play in our cognitive economy? We seemingly have to use color to visually experience objects. Do we do so by inferring size, shape, and motion from color? Or is it a purely automatic operation, accomplished by divine decree? -/- This volume traces the debate over perceptual experience in early modern France, covering such figures as Antoine Arnauld, Robert Desgabets, and Pierre-Sylvain Regis alongside their better-known countrymen Rene Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche. (shrink)